State of Utah v. Harry Irizarry : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
State of Utah v. Harry Irizarry : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elisabeth R. Blattner; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorney for Appellee.
Linda Luinstra; Billy L. Walker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General;
Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Irizarry, No. 930583 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5509
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through the Department of 
Social Services, ex rel. 
CATHY PARKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
HARRY IRIZARRY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 930583-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED ON AUGUST 
11, 1993, BY THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, 
SENIOR JUDGE PRO TEM, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
W5P 
LINDA LUINSTRA #2012 
BILLY L. WALKER #3358 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ELISABETH R. BLATTNER 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorney for Appellee 
F3LED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 3 1 1994 
May T. Noenan 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and ; 
through the Department of 
Social Services, ex rel. 
CATHY PARKER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. ] 
HARRY IRIZARRY, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. 
i Case No, 930583-CA 
i Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED ON AUGUST 
11, 1993, BY THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, 
SENIOR JUDGE PRO TEM, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
LINDA LUINSTRA #2012 
BILLY L. WALKER #3358 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ELISABETH R. BLATTNER 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I 
BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATERNITY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT CASES, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND LACHES 
ARE INAPPROPRIATE AS DEFENSES TO A BIOLOGICAL FATHER'S 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION 10 
A. The Court of Appeals' holding in the unpublished 
Burrow v. Vrontikis decision should not have been 
considered by the lower court to be precedent for 
its decision. „ 10 
B. The doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches 
should not be applied in paternity and child support 
cases to defeat the child's right to past child 
support from his or her biological father. . . . . 16 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY BE APPLIED 
IN A PATERNITY AND CHILD SUPPORT CASE, THEN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS ON THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE 
REPRESENTATION MADE BY MS. PARKER ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 34 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING ON THE REPRESENTATION 
ELEMENT OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, 
THE FACTS FOUND DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO MR. IRIZARRY'S PRE-FILING 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO HIS BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN 43 
i 
CONCLUSION 46 
ADDENDUM 47 
Selected Statutes A-E 
Order Dated August 11,1993 F 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979) 42 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) 12 
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P. 2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) 25 
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1987) 12-14, 16-19, 24-25 
Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 10-16, 18, 25-26, 30 
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990) . . 1 
CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 
(Utah 1989) 2 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 30 
Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . . . . 25 
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981) . . . ., 25 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) 40 
Johnson v. Johnson, 634 P. 2d 877 (Wash. 1981) 34 
Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993) 19 
Leet v. Leet, 624 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1981) 32-33 
Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980) 20, 26, 29 
Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . 28-29 
Mendez v. State, 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 19 
Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984) 26 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 1976) 28 
Nielsen ex.rel. Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 
564 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1977) 17-18, 20-21 
i n 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 14-15 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 1989) 2, 35 
Scott v. School Board, 568 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1977) 22 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P. 2d 568, 570 (Utah 1991) 14 
State v. V.G.P. , 845 P. 2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 20 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981) . 18-19, 21-24, 27 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 
(Utah 1982) 30 
Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988) 32 
Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) 20, 26-29 
Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) . . . 13-14, 16-18, 25 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 ( 2 ) (h) (1993) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-22 (1992) 4, 20 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 (1992) 4, 20, 22-23 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-l (1992) 21 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-2 (1992) 21, 23 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-3 (1992) 4, 9, 20-25, 30 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-10 (1993) 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah R. App. P. 31(b) 4, 13 
Utah R. App. P. 31(c) 13 
Utah R. App. P. 31(d) 13 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-508 15 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 2 
iv 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act 31-32 
S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) 31-32 
v 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and ] 
through the Department of ; 
Social Services, ex rel. ] 
CATHY PARKER, ] 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ; 
v. 
HARRY IRIZARRY, ] 
Defendant/Appellee. 
i Case No. 930583-CA 
i Priority 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
2a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether equitable estoppel or laches should ever apply in 
a paternity case to defeat the obligation of the biological parent 
to pay child support for the period prior to the commencement of 
the paternity action. 
Standard of Review; This is a question of law which this 
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's determination. Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P. 2d 
1095 (Utah 1990) . 
B. Whether the trial court's findings as to a 
"representation" made by Cathy Parker to the biological father are 
clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Review: To attack a trial court's factual 
findings, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of 
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the findings and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings or the findings are otherwise 
clearly erroneous. Schindler v. Schindlerf 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah 
1989); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
C. Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient 
to establish all the elements of equitable estoppel. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which this 
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's determination. CECO Corporation v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A complaint to establish the paternity of Breanna and Brittany 
Parker, born April 18, 1985, was filed by the State of Utah on 
behalf of Cathy A. Parker on May 30, 1989 (R.2-8) and served on the 
defendant June 16, 1989. (R.16-17). A stipulation and agreement 
acknowledging Harry D. Irizarry as the father of Breanna and 
Brittany Parker was signed on or about July 10, 1990 (R.105-106), 
and a Judgement and Order based on Stipulation was entered by the 
court on August 17, 1990. (R.103-104). A motion for temporary 
child support was filed by counsel for Cathy A. Parker on August 
14, 1990. (R.86-87). A hearing was held regarding temporary 
support on September 4, 1990, (R. 91-92) at which time Harry 
Irizarry was ordered to pay $207.72 per month for the support of 
the minor children in this action. (R.192). The Order on Ms. 
Parker's Motion for Temporary Child Support was entered October 22, 
2 
1990. (R.248). 
A trial was held on February 10, 1993, the Honorable David 
Roth, presiding pro tern (R.361), at which the primary issue was Mr. 
Irizarry's obligation to pay child support during the four years 
prior to the commencement of the paternity action. A decision was 
issued from the bench on February 11, 1993. (R.362). Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement were submitted 
to the Court by counsel for Mr. Irizarry. Counsel for the State of 
Utah objected and alternatives were submitted with the objection. 
(R.375-394). Counsel for Harry Irizarry filed Defendant's Response 
to Plaintiff State of Utah's Objection to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement. (R.395-401). Judge Tyrone 
Medley was appointed and began serving as a District Court Judge, 
and inadvertently signed the Findings submitted by the State of 
Utah. A Stipulation and Motion for Order Vacating Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment Signed March 23, 1993 was 
submitted April 28, 1993 (R.404-405), and an Order Vacating 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment was entered 
April 29, 1993. (R.411-412). 
The State then requested a hearing regarding the parties' 
competing versions of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and judgment (R.402-403). This request was denied by Judge David 
Roth on April 8, 1993, with a note that said, "I am adopting this 
transcript [of the February 11 ruling from the bench] as my 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. I don't have the time or 
patience to try to choose which party's version is more accurate." 
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(R.373). 
Judge Medley signed the final Order and Judgement on August 
11, 1993- (R.414-418). The Notice of Appeal was filed by the 
State on September 9, 1993. (R.419-420). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 31(b), provides: 
(b) The following are matters which the court may 
consider for expedited decision without opinion: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues 
based primarily on documents; 
(2) summary judgements; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated 
issues of law. 
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the 
substantive rules of law should be deemed settled, 
although the parties may differ as to their application. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (1992) provides that "an action to 
enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide 
support or maintenance for dependent children" must be brought 
within eight years. 
The Limitation of Acts chapter also provides: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for 
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause 
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the 
time of the disability is not a part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992). The Uniform Act on Paternity, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992), provides: 
The father's liability for past education and necessary 
support are limited to a period of four years next 
preceding the commencement of an action. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June 1984, Cathy Parker was attending school in Utah where 
she met Harry Irizarry. (R.439). Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry 
began dating and developed a sexual relationship. (R.440). As a 
result of this sexual relationship, Ms. Parker became pregnant. 
(R.439). She found out she was pregnant sometime near the end of 
July 1984 or the beginning of August 1984. (R.440). 
Ms. Parker returned to California at the insistence of her 
mother, who found out about the sexual relationship between Ms. 
Parker and Mr. Irizarry. (R.440). After Ms. Parker left Utah, but 
before she informed Mr. Irizarry of her pregnancy, Mr. Irizarry 
wrote her a letter, dated August 6, in which he wrote about his 
upcoming trip to California. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1). 
Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker in California in August 1984, 
when Ms. Parker told him she was pregnant. (R.446-448; 558). Mr. 
Irizarry indicated that he would do what he could to assist Ms. 
Parker financially; however, he indicated he would not be able to 
do much until he finished school in about two years. (R.450, 561). 
In September 1984, Mr. Irizarry testified that he sent money 
(even though he wasn't sure he was the father) to Ms. Parker, which 
she kept. (R.565). The amount of money sent in September was not 
disclosed at the trial, but Mr. Irizarry stated he followed up with 
a telephone call to Ms. Parker after sending this letter. He 
testified that Ms. Parker had been angry during this September 
phone call and had told him not to send money again. (R. 566). 
Mr. Irizarry did not contact Ms. Parker in October 1984. (R.567). 
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Mr. Irizarry sent Ms. Parker a letter in November 1984 and enclosed 
with the letter approximately $20.00. (R.567-568). Ms. Parker 
accepted the money. (R.569). Mr. Irizarry did not send any money 
to Ms. Parker after November 1984. (R.594). 
In the latter part of November 1984, Ms. Parker called Mr. 
Irizarry to tell him that she was expecting twins. (R.452). Mr. 
Irizarry did not contact Ms. Parker in December 1984. (R.452). 
Both parties testified that Mr. Irizarry called Ms. Parker in 
January and she informed Mr. Irizarry that she would give the twins 
the last name of Parker at birth. (R.454, 565-571). When Mr. 
Irizarry called Ms. Parker in January 1985, Ms. Parker testified 
she was angry because she had not heard from Mr. Irizarry in 
December and had not received a present or a Christmas card. 
(R.453). Ms. Parker testified she never told Mr. Irizarry that 
she did not want his support. (R.460). 
Mr. Irizarry met his current wife, Patty Irizarry, in October 
1984. (R.593). He and Mrs. Irizarry began seriously dating in 
February or March 1985. The twins, Breanna and Brittany Parker, 
were born on April 18, 1985. (R.439). Ms. Parker called Mr. 
Irizarry in June 1985 to tell him of the birth of the twins. Ms. 
Parker testified that when she made this call, a female roommate of 
Mr. Irizarry's answered the telephone. Ms. Parker told her of the 
birth of the twins and requested that she have Mr. Irizarry return 
her call. (R.454-455; 573). Mr. Irizarry testified that he tried 
to call Ms. Parker after the birth and had "no luck." (R.574). He 
stated that, after Ms. Parker had left the message about the birth 
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of the children, he had "tried to call her once, to no avail. I 
guess the phone was busy and I didn't try after that." (R.594). 
Ms. Parker testified that, in July 1985, she contacted Mr. 
Irizarry at his father's home. Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry 
discussed the twins and agreed to meet in October 1985 so that Mr. 
Irizarry could meet the babies. (R.455). Mr. Irizarry testified 
that he had no memory of this phone call. (R.574). Ms. Parker 
testified that she came to Utah for the October 1985 meeting but 
Mr. Irizarry did not meet her. She then went to Mr. Irizarry's 
father's house and showed him his granddaughters. (R.456). Mr. 
Irizarry testified that, in February 1986, his father told him that 
Ms. Parker and the twins had visited him in October 1985. (R.574-
576) . 
In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private investigator to 
find Mr. Irizarry. (R.458-459, R.473). The private investigator 
found Mr. Irizarry in Puerto Rico, but he could not find a specific 
address. (R.458-459). 
Mr. Irizarry married his present wife, Patty, in October 1985. 
(R.577). She was at the time of the marriage pregnant with a child 
who was conceived in July 1985 — less than three months after the 
birth of the twins. (R.578). Mr. Irizarry testified that, even 
after Ms. Parker informed him of her pregnancy with twins, he 
decided to marry the woman he loved. (R.577). Mr. Irizarry and 
his wife have four children, whose dates of birth are March 31, 
1986; April 1, 1989; September 20, 1990; and January 21, 1993. 
(R.578-579). 
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In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry honeymooned in Puerto Rico. 
He subsequently began to work in Puerto Rico and did not return to 
Salt Lake until September 1987. (R.579-580). Ms. Parker's mother, 
Marva Parker, wrote a letter dated August 16, 1987, to Mr. 
Irizarry's brother. (R.543). The letter was written without the 
knowledge of Ms, Parker. (R.459) Ms. Parker did not see the 
letter until a deposition was taken as a part of this lawsuit. 
(R.459). In November 1988, Cathy Parker became aware of the return 
of Mr. Irizarry to Utah when her mother, Marva Parker, saw Mr. 
Irizarry at his place of employment in Salt Lake City. (R.585). 
After becoming aware of Mr. Irizarry's return to Utah, on May 
30, 1989, the State of Utah, Department of Social Services filed a 
complaint on behalf of Cathy Parker against Mr. Irizarry to 
establish his paternity of the twins and to fix a support 
obligation from their birth. (R.2-8). A Stipulation and Agreement 
was reached on July 10, 1990 wherein Mr. Irizarry acknowledged he 
was the father of the twins. (R.105-106). An order determining 
him to be the father was entered August 17, 1990. (R.103-104).l 
A temporary order of support setting a child support obligation 
beginning September 1, 1990 was entered October 22, 1990. (R.248-
252) . 
Respite this acknowledgement of the paternity of the twins, 
Mr. Irizarry presented evidence at the February 9, 1993 trial that 
he had had questions about the relationship which Ms. Parker had 
had with an old boyfriend shortly before his relationship with her 
began. (R.551-553). Mr. Irizarry's counsel at the trial asked Ms. 
Parker questions about this previous relationship with another man, 
presumably with the intent to establish her client's belief about 
the seriousness of the relationship between Mr. Irizarry and Ms. 
Parker. (R.480-481) . 
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On February 9, 1993, the court conducted a trial. (R.423). 
Judge David E. Roth made his ruling from the bench on February 11, 
1993. (R.625). The final judgment, entered on August 11, 1993, 
fails to award child support for the time period from April 18, 
1985, when the twins were born, through May 30, 1989. (R.414-418). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A biological father should not be permitted to use the 
equitable doctrine of estoppel as a shield in paternity and child 
support cases to avoid part or all of his obligation to support his 
child. Adequate limitation and protection for the biological 
father's financial obligation is found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 
(1992), which confines the father's financial liability to the four 
years next preceding the filing of the paternity complaint. 
The trial court's findings concerning any 
"representation" by Cathy Parker, even when the evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to them, are not supported by 
sufficient evidence and are clearly erroneous. Assuming that the 
trial court's findings are sufficiently supported by the evidence, 
the facts of this case do not support the application of equitable 
estoppel to bar recovery of child support for the four years prior 
to the filing of the paternity complaint, because the requisite 
elements of representation, reliance, and detriment are lacking. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATERNITY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT CASES, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND 
LACHES ARE INAPPROPRIATE AS DEFENSES TO A BIOLOGICAL 
FATHER'S SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
A. The Court of Appeals' holding in the unpublished 
Burrow v. Vrontikis decision should not have been 
considered by the lower court to be precedent for its 
decision. 
The trial court affirmed the September 1, 19 90 paternity 
judgement involving Breanna and Brittany Parker, who were born 
April 18, 1985. The complaint for paternity and child support was 
filed on May 30, 1989. The Court granted child support arrearages 
to benefit the children only from the date of the filing of the 
complaint until the Court's ruling on temporary child support and 
from the ruling on the temporary support until January 31, 1993. 
The court refused to award support for the period of time from the 
birth of the twins until the filing of the paternity complaint 
approximately four years after the birth of the children. 
It is the position of the State of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services, that the trial court erred in not establishing a child 
support obligation and judgement for arrearages against Mr. 
Irizarry for the four-year period of time from May 30, 1985 through 
May 30, 1989. 
Although the trial court does not specifically so state in its 
Judgement, in its bench ruling the court made certain factual 
findings, which are discussed in detail at Point II of this brief. 
The trial court then proceeded to conclude that 
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the plaintiff made statements, took actions that led the 
defendant to reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing 
to do with him and didn't want his support. In reliance 
upon that, the defendant got on with his life, got 
married and started a family and under those 
circumstances should not be responsible for the payment 
of support until May 30, 1989, when this complaint was 
filed. At that point he obviously knew that the 
plaintiff expected him to support these children. 
(R.629-630). 
Although the court below cites to no legal authority for its 
conclusions, it appears that the court relied upon the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1047 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), as that was the case argued by both counsel 
at the trial. (R. 605-609, 610-614). In Vrontikis, the Court had 
remanded the case back to the trial court after holding, in an 
unpublished opinion (hereinafter Vrontikis I), that equitable 
estoppel was available in a paternity action to bar recovery for 
child support during the period before the paternity complaint was 
filed. The procedural history of the published Vrontikis case 
(Vrontikis II) is of particular importance to this appeal, if 
indeed the court below based its decision upon Vrontikis II as 
being of precedential authority. 
In Vrontikis I, the mother of a seven-year-old child filed a 
paternity action against the father seeking back child support. 
The trial court declared the defendant to be the father and awarded 
back child support for the four-year period prior to the filing of 
the paternity action. The father appealed the court's decision. 
During the pendency of that appeal, the Utah Supreme Court issued 
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Borland v. Chandler, 733 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1987). The Court of 
Appeals then reversed the trial court's judgement on the basis of 
Borland and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration 
as to whether laches and/or estoppel barred the mother's claim for 
pre-filing child support. See Vrontikis, 733 P.2d at 1047. 
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing 
and found that : (1) appellant unreasonably delayed in 
filing her claim for support; (2) this delay was more 
than mere silence because of appellant's representations 
to Snape; (3) respondent reasonably relied upon these 
representations, and so married and assumed additional 
financial obligations; and therefore (4) appellant's 
claim was barred by the doctrine of laches and/or 
equitable estoppel. 
Id. at 1047-1048. 
On appeal in Vrontikis II, the lower court's ruling was 
upheld. The Court of Appeals stated: 
The first time this matter was before this court, we 
held, in an unpublished opinion issued October 15, 1987, 
that an equitable defense was available in a paternity 
action. On that basis, we remanded the case to the trial 
court for it to determine if laches and/or estoppel would 
permit recovery of back child support. That decision is 
law of this case. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If the elements 
of laches and/or estoppel are present, appellant's claim 
is barred. 
Id. at 1048. The Court went on to declare that estoppel is an 
equitable doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their 
rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to 
do so. Upon reviewing the doctrine of estoppel against the facts 
presented to the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court's decision that estoppel precluded the awarding of pre-
filing child support against the father of the child. 
Of particular interest in the Vrontikis II decision is the 
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Court of Appeal's reliance upon its earlier, unpublished, holding 
that "an equitable defense was available in a paternity action." 
Id. at 1048. Presumably that holding was based upon the Supreme 
Court's decision in Borland, which overruled Zito v. Butler, 584 
P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam). Vrontikis, 733 P.2d at 1047. 
However, the Court of Appeal's reasoning in the first Vrontikis 
case is not available for review or analysis by parties to similar 
actions, such as the parties to this appeal. For that reason, the 
holding of Vrontikis I and the Court of Appeal's application of 
that holding as "law of the case" in the Vrontikis II decision 
should be disregarded and considered of no precedential value. 
Rule 31(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
for a process of expedited decisions without opinion. However, the 
cases which qualify for expedited decisions without opinion are 
limited to the following: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based 
primarily on documents; 
(2) summary judgements; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of 
law. 
Subsections (c) and (d) of Rule 31 make clear that an 
appellate court may only issue decisions in unpublished opinions in 
cases in which the substantive rules of law are deemed settled and 
in cases that do not raise substantial constitutional issues, 
issues of significant public interest, issues of law of first 
impression or complicated issues of fact or law. As will become 
apparent from the argument which follows, the Court of Appeals' 
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decision in Vrontikis II to apply a defense of equitable estoppel 
to a paternity and/or child support case was not based upon a 
"settled" substantive rule of law. Clearly, the Court of Appeals 
should not have so cavalierly held, by unpublished decision in 
Vrontikis I, that a child's right to financial support from his or 
her biological father could be compromised by the actions or 
inactions of the custodial parent. Without a published decision, 
it is impossible for the parties in this appeal to discuss or 
analyze the Court's reasoning in Vrontikis I or to know how that 
Court interpreted the Supreme Court's holdings in Zito and Borland. 
The Utah Supreme Court in a number of decisions, in dicta, has 
noted its displeasure with the use of unpublished opinions. In 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 570 n.l (Utah 1991), Justice 
Zimmerman noted with some concern the Court of Appeals' use of Rule 
31 to dispose of the case being considered by the Supreme Court. 
Justice Zimmerman pointed out the limitations of Rule 31 by its 
express terms and opined that, in the Court of Appeals' unpublished 
Gardiner decision, it had established a new rule of Utah law, as 
apparently acknowledged by the opinion itself. Given the paucity 
of precedent in Utah for the rule of law being analyzed in 
Gardiner, Justice Zimmerman felt there was little justification for 
the usage by the Court of Appeals of an unpublished decision. 
In his concurring opinion in Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96 
(Utah 1986), Justice Zimmerman commented on the trial court's 
reliance upon an unpublished opinion of the Supreme Court in making 
its ruling. The Justice expressed his displeasure with the 
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"inadvisable practice" of issuing unpublished decisions and 
advocated for ending the practice of using unpublished opinions. 
[I]f a case deserves being disposed of by written 
opinion, that opinion should be published. If a decision 
truly adds nothing to the law, it should be disposed of 
from the bench or by a short written order that may be 
informative to the parties but to no one else. . . . 
[T]he unpublished opinion . . . became part of a secret 
body of law, available only to those who assiduously 
collect our slip opinions. . . .[0]ther opinions 
comprising this body of law can be brought to the 
attention of trial judges only by those aware of them. 
This gives special advantage to those who do more than 
keep up their subscription to our official reports. 
. When one lawyer is privy to our unpublished 
opinions and another is not, the first lawyer may 
properly conclude that he can use those unpublished 
opinions that support him and ignore those that do not, 
all with a minimal risk of exposure. . . . It is time we 
stopped the practice of using unpublished opinions. 
Id. at 104. 
Because the Court of Appeals' ruling in Vrontikis II was based 
entirely upon the Court's earlier holding in an unpublished 
decision, it is the State's position that the ruling in the second 
Vrontikis case is of no precedential weight or effect. Not having 
access to the earlier unpublished decision, the State cannot 
effectively urge this Court to reconsider or overrule the reasoning 
of that earlier decision for the very reasons cited by Justice 
Zimmerman in the above referenced cases. 
Because the holding in the unpublished Vrontikis case is not 
binding on this Court, see Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-508, this Court 
must determine the current state of the law in Utah with respect to 
usage of equitable defenses in child support and paternity actions 
and apply that law to the present case. 
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B. The doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches should 
not be applied in paternity and child support cases to 
defeat the child's right to past child support from his 
or her biological father. 
Utah's case law with respect to child support and the 
application of the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel is, 
at best, in desperate need of clarification from the appellate 
courts of the State. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Vrontikis 
II, Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), had 
briefly addressed whether the defenses of equitable doctrines of 
laches or estoppel applied in a paternity and child support action 
filed four and one-half years after the birth of the child in 
question. With respect to that issue, the Supreme Court stated: 
"This being a statutory action neither [of the equitable doctrines 
of estoppel or laches] has any application." Zito, 584 P. 2d at 
869. 
This summary holding regarding the nonapplication of equitable 
defenses to a paternity action was reversed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1987). Borland 
held that laches may bar prosecution of an action to establish 
paternity. However, it did not address the issue, presented here, 
of whether the equitable doctrine of estoppel can ever be asserted 
by a biological father to defeat his obligation to support his 
child. 
The primary issue before the Court in Borland was the 
appropriateness of allowing a jury in a paternity case to view the 
child for his resemblance to the alleged father. The action in 
Borland was brought by the State of Utah, Department of Human 
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Services, and the child's mother in 1980, seven years after the 
birth of the child- The father asserted that the action should be 
barred by laches and asserted that the State's failure to prosecute 
the action in a timely fashion was prejudicial to him in that, due 
to the lapse in time, he was prevented from gathering and producing 
documents and witnesses essential to his defense. The Supreme 
Court cited the reliance by the State and the mother on the holding 
in Zito and then concluded that laches may apply to preclude 
prosecution of a statutory paternity action but that the facts of 
that case were insufficient to invoke it. Borland, 733 P. 2d at 
The principle relied upon by the plaintiffs here has its 
roots in the common law distinction between law and 
equity. At common law, an equitable defense could not be 
raised to a legal action, and because a statutory action 
was legal in nature, equitable defenses would not apply. 
This seems to be the theory behind Zito, a per curiam 
opinion. However, Utah long ago abolished any formal 
distinction between law and equity. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
2. It is well established that equitable defenses may be 
applied in actions at law and that principles of equity 
apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice. 
(Citations omitted.) Therefore, it is clear that under 
appropriate circumstances
 r laches may bar an action for 
paternity. Even the majority opinion in Nielsen ex.rel. 
Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113, 
1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito, recognizes in dictum 
that laches might apply in a paternity action. Therefore 
we conclude that to the extent that Zito stands for the 
proposition that an equitable defense is not available, 
it is an incorrect statement of the law and is overruled. 
Id. at 146 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court went on to hold that, in order to 
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successfully assert a laches2 defense, a defendant must establish 
both that (1) the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an 
action and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by that delay. Jjd. at 
147. The Court ruled that Mr. Borland had not established his 
attempts to seek witnesses and his inability to locate these 
witnesses or his employment time cards in order to establish his 
whereabouts at the time of the child's conception. The Court found 
that Mr. Borland had conceded his return to Utah during part of the 
conception period and that the introduction of evidence and 
testimony of witnesses would not have materially assisted his 
defense. "Under the circumstances, no prejudice is apparent and 
further prosecution is not barred by laches." Id. 
The Court in Borland noted in a footnote that the Court in 
Zito had discussed the application of the statute of limitations to 
a paternity action and had cited the case of Nielsen ex.rel. 
Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977), 
and its analysis of the application of a statute of limitations to 
child support matters. The Borland Court stated that a "better 
reasoned and more recent statement of the law may be found in 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1982 (Utah 1981)." Borland, 733 P.2d 
at 14 7 n.l. The Court's footnote raises the question, unexplored 
by the Court in Borland, of what would be an "appropriate 
circumstance" in which an equitable defense, such as laches or 
2Borland and Zito analyzed the complete defense of laches, and 
yet the Court of Appeals in Vrontikis utilized those decisions for 
its holding with respect to the application of equitable estoppel 
in a paternity action to bar recovery of child support only during 
the pre-filing period. See note 3, infra. 
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estoppel, would bar an action for paternity against a biological 
father, when under Szarak the statute of limitations is tolled for 
the filing of a paternity action during the period of the child's 
minority. Another question is how, in light of Szarak, the 
doctrine of laches could be used at all as a defense by the 
biological father to a paternity action when the child is the 
intended beneficiary of a child support order and a child, during 
the period of his minority, cannot act to delay bringing a legal 
action.3 See also Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993) 
(statutes of limitations and repose unconstitutional as applied to 
minor's malpractice claim). 
It is the State's position that it is not an "appropriate 
circumstance," within the holding in Borland, to allow a biological 
father to use equitable doctrines to shield him from his financial 
obligation to support a child he fathered. On the other hand, 
equitable defenses in the child support area may be "appropriate" 
when employed as a sword by the mother, the child or the public 
authority to hold a legal (albeit not biological) father 
3Another peculiar feature of the application of laches and/or 
estoppel in a child support context is that the employment of those 
defenses in the domestic area has not been interpreted as an 
absolute bar to a biological father's obligation to pay child 
support, but as only a partial bar prior to the time that a 
paternity and/or support action is filed. Typically when the 
elements of equitable estoppel have been demonstrated, the defense 
is an absolute bar to the liability of the person successfully 
asserting the defense. See generally Mendez v. State, 813 P. 2d 
1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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responsible for financial support to that child.4 
Utah statutes provide two separate statutes of limitations 
with respect to child support actions. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 
(1992) provides that "an action to enforce any liability due or to 
become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for 
dependent children" must be brought within eight years. The 
Limitation of Acts chapter also provides: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for 
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause 
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the 
time of the disability is not a part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992). 
The Uniform Act on Paternity provides: 
The father's liability for past education and necessary 
support are limited to a period of four years next 
preceding the commencement of an action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992). 
In Nielsen, a 1977 decision, the State and a child's mother 
brought an action to establish paternity and to impose a child 
support obligation, seeking support for only four months prior to 
the filing of the action. The trial court had dismissed the 
complaint based upon the statute of limitations, specifically 
section 78-12-22. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, 
holding there was no time limitation as to when a suit may be 
instituted to determine paternity, noting that Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-
A
 See Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985); Mace v. Webb, 
614 P.2d 746 (Utah 1980); see generally State v. V.G.P. 845 P.2d 94 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) . 
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45a-3 limited the father's liability for past support to the period 
of four years next preceding the commencement of the action. 
The significance of the reasoning in Nielson is the Court's 
focus upon the child's interest in paternity and child support 
cases: 
The child has an interest in the matter and courts should 
be reluctant to invent limitations not set out in the 
statute, especially where minor children may be adversely 
affected thereby. Ordinarily a statute limiting the time 
for bringing an action is considered to be in the public 
interest in that it prevents groundless actions from 
being won because of defendant's inability to present 
evidence. In cases of establishing paternity, there are 
other public policy considerations such as the need of a 
minor child for support and the requirement that the man 
who actually sired the child be required to furnish its 
support. 
564 P.2d at 1114. 
The issue of the statute of limitations and child support 
collection was raised again in Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P. 2d 1082 
(Utah 1981). In that decision, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the question of limitation of actions applicable to paternity and 
child support cases had been a "troubled one, complicated by 
multiple parties, overlapping statutes, and contradictory judicial 
opinions." Id. at 1083. The Court analyzed the Uniform Act on 
Paternity and observed that a petition seeking to have paternity 
established may be filed by the mother, the child, or the public 
authority (the Department of Human Services) and that, once 
paternity is established, the liability for child support may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings again, by the mother, the 
child, or the public authority. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l, 
78-45a-2 (1992). 
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The question before the Court in Szarak was whether there was 
a limitation of time within which an action for paternity may be 
commenced, recognizing that section 78-45a-3 limited the recovery 
of back child support to the four years next preceding the 
commencement of the paternity action* In answer to that question, 
the Supreme Court concluded that section 78-12-36, the tolling 
statute regarding causes of actions of minors, precluded the 
application of any period of limitation against the child, the 
child's mother, and the public authority. Szarak, 636 P. 2d at 
1085. 
The Court adopted its earlier reasoning in Scott v. School 
Board, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), a personal injury case involving 
a minor. In Scott, the Court pointed out that, because parents or 
natural guardians have no specific legal duty to commence actions 
on behalf of their minor children or wards, without a statutory 
tolling provision for minors, the minor would be left completely 
without a remedy. The Court in Szarak went on to hold that the 
statute of limitations was also tolled during the child's minority 
for a paternity and child support action undertaken by the child's 
mother and/or the State Department of Social Services, based upon 
the public policies protected by the tolling provisions of section 
78-12-36. u[A]ny statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the Uniform Act on 
Paternity is tolled for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the period of the child's minority." Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1085. 
The protection afforded the biological father was the ceiling 
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on the amount of the recovery for past child support (limited to 
the period of four years next preceding the commencement of the 
action), set forth in section 78-45a-3. The Court observed the 
important public policy reasons for tolling the statute of 
limitations for filing a paternity action during the child's 
minority: 
The father's liability for the education and support 
of the child can be enforced by parties other than the 
child, but in such cases the child is still the real 
party in interest. An action of this nature has no 
purpose other than to benefit the child, directly or 
indirectly. No useful purpose would be served by 
construing § 78-12-36 so as to preclude paternity actions 
in the name of the mother or the public authority or 
others who qualify as plaintiffs under the Uniform Act, 
when those same parties would not be barred from bringing 
the same action as next friend or guardian of the child. 
Viewed from the defendant's perspective, this long 
extension of the period of his (the alleged father's) 
vulnerability to this kind of action obviously runs 
counter to the policies served by the statutes of 
limitations, but the Legislature has resolved the 
conflicting policies in favor of the interests of the 
minor child and those who support him . . . and we are 
obliged to follow their clear direction. 
Id. at 1085 (emphasis added). 
It is the State's position that these same clear public policy 
directions which protect the interests of a child in financial 
support from his biological parent militate against allowing a 
legally established father to assert the defenses of laches or 
estoppel to avoid his child support obligation. The child, under 
section 78-45a-2 of the Uniform Act on Paternity, has a cause of 
action in his or her own right against the father for child 
support. The child is the real party in interest in every 
paternity and/or child support action. It makes no sense to allow 
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an equitable defense, such as laches or estoppel, to be asserted 
against the mother of a child when that same defense could not be 
asserted against the child himself should the same action be 
brought in the child's name by a next friend or legal guardian. 
The child cannot act, as the Court held in Borland, to 
"unreasonably delay bringing an action" because the child's action 
to establish paternity and enforce child support cannot be barred 
by resting on his cause of action until after the child attains the 
age of majority. 
As the Court has pointed out in Szarak, the father may be 
vulnerable to a paternity and support action for a long period of 
time. However, the Legislature has determined to grant to the 
child, and to those persons supporting the child (the mother and 
the public authority who may be supporting the child) eighteen 
years in which to bring an action for paternity and support. This 
public policy determination is predicated upon the child being the 
real party in interest in a paternity and support action. In light 
of that clear policy directive from both the Utah Legislature and 
the Utah Supreme Court, it is the position of the State that the 
equitable defense of laches should not be entertained as a defense 
to preclude either the State, the custodial parent, or the child 
from recovering back child support in a paternity action. The only 
limitation that should be applied in such cases is that set forth 
in section 78-45a-3, limiting recovery of support to the period of 
four years next preceding the commencement of the paternity action. 
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In a similar fashion and for the same public policy rationale, 
the defense of equitable estoppel predicated upon the actions or 
inactions of a child's mother, prior to the filing of a paternity 
complaint, should not be allowed to defeat the child's right to 
financial support from his father, except as provided by section 
78-45a-3.3 
The Court of Appeals in Vrontikis II utilized the Utah Supreme 
Court's holdings in the laches cases cited above, specifically Zito 
and Borland, as authority for allowing equitable estoppel as a 
defense against the mother in a paternity and child support case. 
The Court in Vrontikis cited to a number of non-child support cases 
and then set forth the necessary proof required to establish 
equitable estoppel. 
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties 
from asserting their rights where their actions render it 
inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. 
Estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) a 
statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2) the other 
party's reasonable action or inaction based upon the 
first party's statement, admission, act or failure to 
act, and (3) injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
its statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Vrontikis, 788 P.2d at 1048. While the Court in Vrontikis did set 
forth accurately the elements of equitable estoppel, it did not 
analyze the appropriateness of allowing that defense in a child 
3Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child 
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot 
be bartered away or estopped by the child's parents or others. 
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981); Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 
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support action, a unique action in which the State of Utah is a 
party and in which the child is the real party in interest. 
The cases cited by the Vrontikis court for the foregoing 
proposition are not child support cases. The defense of equitable 
estoppel in a child support situation has been reviewed 
specifically by the Utah Supreme Court in a number of decisions. 
The Court's analysis in those cases is helpful, although they are 
not directly on point to the present case. In Mace v. Webb, 614 P. 
2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that 
"in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the 
basis of estoppel or implied contract." However, the Court also 
expressed a caveat that "the use of an estoppel theory to impose a 
support obligation on a man who is not the biological father of the 
child involved must be applied with caution." Id. at 649. It is 
important to note that in Mace, the Court discussed estoppel in the 
context of imposing a support obligation on a non-biological 
father, not in the context of allowing the defense to evade a 
support obligation on the part of the biological father, as the 
Court of Appeals allowed in Vrontikis and as the trial court has 
allowed in the instant case. 
The same issue was before the Court in Wiese v. Wiese, 699 
P. 2d 700 (Utah 1985), in which the mother argued that the 
stepfather of her child was equitably estopped from avoiding a duty 
of support to the child he had treated as his own during the 
marriage. The Supreme Court cited with approval the reasoning in 
Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984), which held that 
26 
the party asserting equitable estoppel must carry the burden to 
show that the stepfather's actions have precluded the obtaining of 
support from the biological father. The Court agreed with the New 
Jersey Court in requiring the party alleging equitable estoppel to 
prove that the stepfather's conduct established the three 
prerequisites to equitable estoppel: representation, reliance and 
detriment. Wiese, 699 P.2d at 702. 
Of particular note in the Wiese decision is the Supreme 
Court's recognition, as in Szarak, of the child's separate and 
independent interest in a support action. 
[N]o legal authority is cited for the proposition that 
[stepfather's] representations to the 1976 divorce court 
preclude the boy, who was not a party to that action, 
from obtaining support from his biological father. Other 
jurisdictions have held that if a child is not a party to 
a previous action adjudging him the offspring of the 
parties, the child is not bound by that finding. 
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703 (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court in Wiese reversed the lower court's 
judgement and order of support entered against the stepfather, 
without prejudice to the mother to again bring an action for 
support against the stepfather when her efforts to obtain support 
from the biological father (presumably her first husband) had been 
concluded. Only then could it be determined whether equitable 
estoppel would lie. Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703.6 
6It is interesting to note that the child at issue had been 
born in 197 3 and the case remanded for the mother to pursue support 
from her first husband in 1985 (the presumed biological father of 
the child.) The Utah Supreme Court made no reference to the 
possibility that biological father might defeat his support 
obligation by invoking the defenses of laches and/or estoppel. 
The only potential concerns recognized by the Court with respect to 
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In a later case, Masters v. Worsley, 777 P. 2d 499 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), an ex-husband challenged the paternity of three 
children born to his wife during their marriage after evidence of 
the wife's unfaithfulness was uncovered after the divorce. The 
wife asserted that her ex-husband was equitably estopped from 
denying liability for support of the three children. Again, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel was being utilized to affirm, rather 
than to defeat, a child support obligation. In the Masters 
decision, the Court of Appeals stated that equitable estoppel may 
only be invoked when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise 
perpetrate a fraud or unfair advantage. The Court found that 
Masters, the ex-husband, had not known that he was not the minor 
children's father. "Equitable estoppel may be invoked only to aid 
a party who, without fault of his or her own, was 'deluded into a 
course of action by the wrong of neglect of another.'" Masters, 
777 P.2d at 503 (citing Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1976) ) . 
The Court of Appeals found that the mother had failed to 
establish she was without fault in misleading her ex-husband to 
believe he was the father of the children born during their 
marriage. Thus, the Court concluded Mr. Masters was not equitably 
estopped from terminating his child support obligation under the 
previous divorce decree. In the instant case, Mr. Irizarry knew of 
the biological father were that, after the passage of twelve years, 
the mother may be unable to locate the natural parent or for valid 
legal reasons may be unable to obtain jurisdiction over him. 
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703. 
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the birth of the twins and certainly cannot argue, and has not 
argued, that he was ignorant of their existence or that he had been 
deluded into thinking no children had issued from his relationship 
with Cathy Parker. 
The Court in Masters, 777 P. 2d at 502, noted with approval the 
language of Wiese and Mace that "the use of an estoppel theory to 
impose a support obligation on a man who is not the biological 
father of the child involved must be applied with caution." It is 
the State's position that the corollary to the foregoing 
proposition is equally, or more, fitting in a paternity case and 
child support case. Namely, the use of an equitable estoppel 
theory in a paternity case to defeat the support obligation of the 
biological father should not be allowed. The clear public policy 
interest favoring financial support of one's children and the 
child's separate and distinct interest in financial support, 
regardless of the actions or inactions of his biological parents, 
weigh in favor of rejecting the defense of estoppel in paternity 
and child support actions. The limitations of financial liability 
found in the applicable limitations statutes afford the non-
custodial parent ample protection. 
Additional support for the ruling the State seeks here is 
found in the general rule of law that the doctrine of estoppel is 
not assertable against the State and its agencies. The only 
exception to this general rule of law is where it is plain that the 
interests of justice so require. In cases in which such an issue 
arises, the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts 
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may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered 
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception, Utah State 
Univ. v. Sutro & Co,, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982); Eldredqe v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Because the State of Utah has separate standing and interest 
as a party in child support and paternity cases, it is certainly 
inadvisable and violative of the general rule of law espoused above 
for the doctrine of estoppel to be invoked in child support and 
paternity actions to defeat a claim for child support. The State 
of Utah, Department of Human Services, has a clear public policy 
interest in paternity and child support cases, which is separate 
and apart from that of the custodial parent and the child. 
The application of the underlying holding and the reasoning of 
Vrontikis to all paternity cases has allowed the putative father in 
every paternity case to merely assert that the mother indicated, or 
"suggested," in some manner she did not want support. To invoke 
equitable principles in this way negates sound public policy 
favoring the responsibility to support one's children. It ignores 
the clear mandate of section 78-45-3, which states that every man 
shall support his child. 
The burden placed upon the mother by the reasoning in 
Vrontikis is extreme and unwarranted. Not only must she inform the 
putative father that she is expecting his child, but she must 
document every attempt she had made to remind him of his statutory 
duty to provide financially for the child. The result is that a 
woman who is facing the tremendous obligations of an unplanned 
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pregnancy is held to a standard of behavior beyond realistic 
expectations as she deals with the father of the child, a man who 
often has abandoned her upon learning of the conception of the 
child. It seems reasonable that she would react in anger, 
frequently demanding that he have nothing to do with her or the 
child. Such actions should not negate the law which is clear, 
i.e., that he must provide for the support of his child. 
In addition to the separate interest of the child in a 
paternity and support action, courts have uniformly found that a 
State has a substantial public interest in collecting child 
support. That public interest can be gleaned from an examination 
of the legislative purpose in enacting Title IV-D of the Social 
Security Act. Congress, at the time, was concerned that the 
welfare problem in this country was largely precipitated through 
the non-support of children by absent parents and that four out of 
every five recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) were in that condition as a result of the deprivation of 
parental support. See Senate (Finance Committee) Report Rep. No. 
93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code 
Congressional and Administrative News 8133, 8145. The solution was 
to have the custodial parent, as a precondition of eligibility for 
welfare, assign all rights to child support payments to the state 
and then grant incentives to the states to enforce collection of 
those debts. Id. at 8152-54. The procedures for collecting child 
support were also required to be made available to families that 
were not receiving AFDC in order to keep them off the welfare 
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rolls. Id. at 8158. The duty of the child support enforcement 
agency is to protect the integrity of the state's welfare rolls by 
either collecting on the assignments of outstanding support 
obligations or by enforcing child support obligations to prevent 
custodial parents from going on public assistance. This duty to 
recoup, or preserve, the State's available welfare funds creates a 
separate and distinct interest in the State of Utah in the 
establishment of paternity and the collection of child support, an 
interest that may conflict with the interests of the custodial 
parent. 
In Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988), the 
court analyzed the Title IV-D program and found that the IV-D 
program seeks to recover funds provided to children in need and to 
restore to the federal Treasury, through enforcement of support 
obligations, those monies owed by absent parents of children. 
The driving force behind the program is recovery of 
welfare payments and a parallel commitment to remove and 
keep families from the necessity of welfare dependence by 
establishing and enforcing support obligations. The 
legislative history indicates that in enacting Title IV-D 
Congress was primarily concerned with collecting child 
support in order to reduce the welfare rolls. 
Id. at 1565. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals has found a substantial state 
interest in collecting child support in both AFDC and non-AFDC 
collection cases. In Leet v. Leet, 624 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1981), Mrs. 
Leet had a non-AFDC child support collection case open with the 
State of Missouri. The State filed contempt proceedings against 
Mr. Leet for his failure to pay child support. Mr. Leet countered 
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by arguing that the State was violating its state constitution's 
ban on granting public monies to agencies or organizations for 
private purposes. He claimed that since Mrs. Leet was not on 
welfare, the state was enforcing her private interest and had no 
public interest at stake. The trial court agreed with Mr. Leet and 
ruled that the state's involvement in a non-AFDC collection case 
violated the state's constitutional ban of public expenditures on 
private interests. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, 
finding that the State has a substantial public interest in 
enforcing child support collection cases, including non-AFDC cases: 
[The requirement that states enforce non-AFDC as well as 
AFDC collection cases] was a recognition by Congress that 
in view of the increasing costs of welfare payments to 
families of abandoned children it is in the public 
interest not only to get and keep families off the 
welfare rolls, but also to assist families in not 
becoming members of those rolls. 
Id. at 23. The Court in Leet concluded that the fact that there is 
a benefit to the custodial parent from the State's child support 
collection services does not change the public purpose of the 
collection: 
The law does not require [the courts] to determine 
whether the public or private citizens benefit 'more' by 
reason of the legislation. Rather, the rule is that if 
the primary purpose of the act is public, the fact that 
special benefits may accrue to some private persons does 
not deprive the government action of its public 
character, such benefits being incidental to the primary 
public purpose. 
Id. at 23. 
The Washington Supreme Court has similarly concluded that 
federal and state statutes created the child support enforcement 
program to further the compelling public interest in "safeguarding 
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the child's constitutional rights, protecting the taxpayers, and 
assuring that the primary obligation for child support falls on the 
parents." Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877, 881 
(1981) . 
This separate and important interest held by the State of 
Utah, especially in light of the general rule of nonapplication of 
estoppel as a defense against the State, also militates against the 
defenses of laches and estoppel being used to avoid the recovery of 
child support from a biological father. The State of Utah, 
Department of Human Services, maintains that, in the context of 
paternity and child support actions, the defenses of equitable 
estoppel and laches predicated upon the actions or inactions of the 
custodial parent should not be employed to defeat the right of the 
child to financial support from his or her biological father. The 
trial court in this case should not have used the doctrine of 
estoppel to shield Mr. Irizarry from four years of his support 
obligation to his natural children. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY BE 
APPLIED IN A PATERNITY AND CHILD SUPPORT CASEf THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS ON THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE 
REPRESENTATION MADE BY MS. PARKER ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
In order to mount a successful attack on the lower court's 
factual findings in this appeal, the State of Utah must marshall 
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing evidence in light most favorable to 
the findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings, 
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or that the findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, even though there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed. The appellate court 
does not consider evidence de novo, so the mere fact that the 
reviewing court may reach a different result than the trial court, 
on the same evidence, does not justify setting aside the trial 
court's findings. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
The burden upon the State has been met in this case, because, 
after marshalling all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
those findings, the evidence is patently insufficient to support 
the lower court's apparent finding that there was a statement, 
admission, or act on the part of Ms. Parker that was inconsistent 
with her later-asserted claim for child support for her children 
for the four years prior to the filing of the paternity complaint 
against Mr. Irizarry. The lower court's findings with respect to 
the representation element of equitable estoppel are clearly 
erroneous in that the court has interpreted Ms. Parker's actions or 
omissions prior to the birth of the children to constitute a 
representation that she did not want financial support from Mr. 
Irizarry for those children. The court pointed out in its ruling 
from the bench that the 
critical, factual issue in determining whether the 
defendants should be responsible for support during 1985 
to 1987 period is whether or not the plaintiff made 
statements claimed by the defendant in those three phone 
35 
calls. Plaintiffs denies making statements to him 
suggesting she doesn't want support from him for the 
children. 
In making this "critical, factual" finding with respect to the 
representations made by Ms. Parker to Mr. Irizarry, the trial court 
focused upon four other underlying factual findings or reasons. 
The court's first finding (R.628) was as follows: 
[DJuring the period of time in question, there is no 
indication that the plaintiff [Ms. Parker] made calls or 
wrote letters to the defendant [Mr. Irizarry] asking for 
support. It appears that all the communications at that 
time were from the defendant to the plaintiff. 
The lower court relied on the following evidence to support 
its findings: 
1. A September 1984 letter from Mr. Irizarry to Ms. 
Parker (which was not offered into evidence). Mr. 
Irizarry testified that he sent an undisclosed amount of 
money with this letter and followed it up with a phone 
call. (R.565-566). Mr. Irizarry testified that Ms. 
Parker was angry when he spoke to her in September and 
"she was clearly angry at me for sending money and she 
said not to send money again. She would finish her 
degree and do it on her own." (R.566). 
2. A November 1984 letter to Ms. Parker in which Mr. 
Irizarry testified he enclosed $20. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2). 
3. A January 1985 phone call from Mr. Irizarry to Ms. 
Parker in which she informed him that she would be naming 
the children "Parker" on their birth certificate. (R. 
454, 565-571). In this conversation, Mr. Irizarry 
testified that Ms. Parker said: "I don't want to have to 
do anything with you anymore." (R.572). Mr. Irizarry 
also testified that at that time, he still believed that 
he had a financial obligation to the twins, if they were 
his children. (R.572). 
Although there is some evidence supporting the lower court's 
findings regarding efforts on the part of Mr. Irizarry to contact 
Ms. Parker, the evidence is also clear that all of these contacts 
occurred prior to the birth of the children and, thus, prior to any 
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legally enforceable financial obligation existing against the 
biological father. The children were born in April 1985 and Mr. 
Irizarry testified himself that he only made one half-hearted 
attempt to reach Ms. Parker after the birth, i.e, the phone call to 
her when the phone was busy. (R.594). From the testimony at the 
trial, an inference could certainly be drawn that Mr. Irizarry 
still had doubts about the paternity of the twins, considering his 
beliefs regarding Ms. Parker's having had a previous relationship 
with another man. (R. 480-481).7 
However, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the findings, it is clear that Mr. Irizarry made no serious 
effort to contact Ms. Parker after the birth of the twins or to 
communicate his position with respect to their financial support, 
assuming they were proved to be his biological children. Ms. 
Parker's only affirmative representations with respect to her 
future plans to seek support from Mr. Irizarry were an angry phone 
call in November 1984 and another angry phone call in January 1985, 
both prior to the birth of the twins. 
In addition, the trial court's "finding" with respect to the 
inaction of Ms. Parker in contacting Mr. Irizarry ignores her 
efforts to inform Mr. Irizarry about the children after their 
birth. Her efforts can be summarized as follows: 
1. In June 1985, Ms. Parker called to tell Mr. Irizarry 
7
"I was very anxious and upset [at Ms. Parker's reaction to 
the November letter] because I was trying to do the right thing 
even though I wasn't sure that I was the father. I was trying to 
do the right thing and she was angry at that. So I was upset too." 
(R.570). 
37 
that the children were born and left the message with a 
female roommate. She left a message asking Mr. Irizarry 
to call her. (R.454, 573). 
2. In July 1985, Ms. Parker testified that contacted Mr. 
Irizarry at his father's home and they discussed the 
twins and set up a meeting time for October 19 85 to see 
the twins. (R.455). Mr. Irizarry denied any memory of 
this phone call. (R.574-576.) 
3. In October 19 85, Ms. Parker arrived to meet Mr. 
Irizarry. The meeting never occurred but Ms. Parker did 
take the children to the home of Andre Irizarry, (their 
grandfather) to meet him. (R. 456). Mr. Irizarry 
testified that he became aware of this meeting in 
February 1986 while living in Puerto Rico. (R.456). 
4. In October 1985, Ms. Parker went to Mr. Irizarry's 
father's home [looking for Mr. Irizarry]. (R.456). 
5. In February 1987, Ms. Parker hired a private 
investigator to find Mr. Irizarry. (R.458-459, 473). 
These affirmative actions taken by Ms. Parker to contact Mr. 
Irizarry, after the birth of the children (when his support 
obligation became enforceable), are more consistent with a finding 
that she did want Mr. Irizarry's support for her children than the 
contrary. Her efforts occurred after the birth of the children. 
Mr. Irizarry's minimal efforts and offers of support occurred prior 
to the birth when he still may have been questioning the paternity 
of the children.8 Even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's finding with respect to 
communications between the parties, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the finding and is clearly erroneous. 
8Ms. Parker testified that she had never told Mr. Irizarry 
that she did not want him to pay support for the twins. (R.460) 
The lower court in its ruling did not indicate that Ms. Parker 
lacked credibility on this issue of financial support nor did it 
indicate that other testimony clearly contradicted Ms. Parker's 
statements under oath. 
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The trial court's next subsidiary finding is as follows: 
[T]he plaintiff left the defendant's name off the birth 
certificates. This suggests to me or at least reinforces 
the defendant's belief that she wanted nothing to do with 
him, I have no trouble with her naming the children 
"Parker." There is no law, I am aware of, requiring that 
the children bear the father's name. The best interest 
of the children are what prevailed there, and under these 
circumstances, in my mind, there is nothing wrong with 
the children being named "Parker." But leaving the 
father's name off the birth certificates suggest to me 
some animosity toward the defendant and suggest to me 
that where the defendant said she said she wanted nothing 
to do with him, that may have been correct. 
(R.628). From Ms. Parker's emotional response to Mr. Irizarry's 
January 1985 phone call, the trial court inferred she made a 
representation suggesting she wanted "nothing to do with him," 
presumably including that she did not want financial support for 
her as-yet-unborn children. (R.453). The trial court acknowledged 
that the choice of the children's last name was probably in the 
best interest of the children, yet inferred that such a decision 
shows antagonism towards the father. If it is proper for a court 
to deem antagonism between parents as a proper factor to consider 
in determining whether child support is owing, then there would be 
very few children receiving support. 
Even viewing the evidence with respect to Ms. Parker's 
decision to give her twins her last name in the light most 
favorable to the court's findings, that evidence is insufficient to 
support the court's apparent finding that Ms. Parker had 
represented she wanted no financial support for her children after 
their birth. 
The court's third subsidiary finding is as follows: 
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[D]uring the time from August of '84 to the birth of the 
children, or until October of '85, plaintiff had family 
support. She had insurance to cover, I assume, most of 
the birth cost. She was about to start a career as a 
nurse and she was capable of supporting herself and her 
children. There is pretty good evidence of animosity 
from her family toward the defendant which suggested 
likely she didn't want much to do with him at the time. 
I find this first because the family moved her from Salt 
Lake City to California to discourage her relationship 
with the defendant. And at the time the defendant 
visited in California, her mother especially was very 
angry with the defendant. 
JR.628-29). 
The foregoing finding by the trial court, although supportable 
in the evidence, utilizes the feelings of Ms, Parker's family and 
her ability to support herself as a basis for finding that she 
"represented" to the biological father that she did not want his 
financial support for her children. No case law supports the trial 
court's attribution of the feelings of Ms. Parker's family to her 
desire for support. Ms. Parker's mother's feelings towards Mr. 
Irizarry are irrelevant to a finding of estoppel because those 
feelings do not involve any conduct, inaction or representation by 
Ms. Parker. See generally Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430, 432 
(Utah 1983). Furthermore, there is no case law to support the 
trial court's suggestion that Ms. Parker's efforts to educate and 
obtain employment to support herself and her children would 
necessitate a finding that she did not want or need support from 
the biological father of those children. Such a finding, if upheld 
as proper, would have a chilling effect on mothers who are making 
an effort to provide financially for their children. The trial 
court's findings in this regard are clearly beside the point and 
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insupportable and, to the extent that they have been utilized to 
bolster the court's ultimate finding that Ms. Parker represented to 
Mr. Irizarry that she wanted no child support, should be completely 
disregarded by this Court. 
The trial court's fourth subsidiary finding is as follows: 
[T]he letter dated November 18, 1984 from the defendant 
to the plaintiff suggests the defendant's willingness to 
accept responsibility for the child and pay for support. 
But to me his statement in that letter thanking the 
plaintiff for accepting the money suggests that there had 
been some discussions about this in earlier 
conversations: that the plaintiff didn't want money from 
the defendant. I find it unusual that he would say 
"Thank you for accepting this money." 
(R.629). 
The foregoing factual finding is supported only by the actual 
content of the November 18, 1984 letter. That letter (Plaintiff's 
Ex. 2) states, in pertinent part: 
Here I include some $. I know is [sic] nothing, but a 
little never hurts. As I already told you I am gong to 
keep sending some every month, depending on the budget. 
Thanks for accepting it, because I think is [sic] my 
responsibility to help in the best way I can. I hope to 
hear from you soon. In the meantime take care of 
yourself and of the baby too. Love Harry. 
The trial court inferred from Mr. Irizarry's "thank you for 
iccepting" language that he had been forced to ask Ms. Parker to 
:ake any kind of support and that she had represented she did not 
*ant financial support after the birth of the twins. However, the 
:estimony also indicated that the support offered in this letter 
ms only $20 and was money offered to Ms. Parker prior to the birth 
)f the twins. (R. 567-568). A more plausible inference from the 
.etter would be that Ms. Parker was insulted by the tender of a 
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mere $20 when she was undergoing a pregnancy and the substantial 
expenses of necessary prenatal care. 
The letter could also be interpreted as an acknowledgement on 
the part of Mr. Irizarry of his responsibility to provide support 
for the baby expected by Ms. Parker. In its findings, the court 
failed to address the testimony of Ms. Parker that she never said 
she did not want support (R.460), that she accepted the support 
money which was sent (R.549), and that Mr. Irizarry represented to 
her that he would do what he could financially to assist her. 
(R.450, 561). In addition, at most Mr. Irizarry could establish 
Ms. Parker's silence from the time she attempted to contact him in 
July and October 1985 until February 1987 when she hired a private 
detective to try to locate him, without success. The evidence 
indicates that Ms. Parker did not know the whereabouts of Mr. 
Irizarry for the majority of the four years between the birth of 
the girls until the filing of the paternity complaint. At best, 
any delay was mere silence on the part of Ms. Parker. The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that mere silence is not sufficient for a 
finding of estoppel, unless there is some duty to speak, Adams v. 
Adams, 593 P. 2d 147 (Utah 1979), and there was no such duty in this 
case. 
Even viewing all of the evidence offered at trial in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's finding on the element of the 
representations or actions of Ms. Parker that could have led Mr. 
Irizarry to believe that she did not want support for her children, 
the evidence is simply insufficient to support the factual finding 
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that Ms. Parker made such a representation. Without evidence to 
support that finding, the trial court clearly erred in finding that 
Ms. Parker is estopped to assert claims for child support for the 
four years prior to the filing of the paternity complaint against 
y[r. Irizarry. Additionally, the lower court made no clear finding 
Dn the other two requisite elements of equitable estoppel--i.e., 
regarding Mr. Irizarry's reliance upon Ms. Parker's statements and 
lis consequent detriment. Without a clear finding on all elements 
Df estoppel, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that 
estoppel barred recovery of support during the pre-filing period. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING ON THE REPRESENTATION 
ELEMENT OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, 
THE FACTS FOUND DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO MR. IRIZARRY'S PRE-FILING 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO HIS BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN. 
If equitable estoppel is available to bar recovery of child 
lupport from a biological father that accrued prior to filing of 
.he paternity action, this Court must next determine whether the 
vidence presented to the trial court in this case was sufficient 
o support a finding of estoppel. 
As discussed in detail above, a parry alleging equitable 
stoppel as a defense must establish three clear prerequisites: 
epresentation, reliance and detriment. Mr. Irizarry has not met 
he burden of establishing these elements of estoppel. The 
tatements, actions, or inactions of Ms. Parker, which the lower 
ourt found to be inconsistent with her later assertion of a claim 
Dr child support for her two children, predated the birth of those 
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children. As already set forth at Point II of this Brief, the 
trial court's findings regarding the actions or inactions of Ms. 
Parker as evidence of a representation "suggesting" that support 
would not be sought are not supported and are clearly erroneous. 
The second element of estoppel (on which the lower court 
failed to make a clear finding) is that Mr. Irizarry took 
reasonable action based upon the statements or actions of Ms. 
Parker. This element is not supported by the evidence presented to 
the trial court. Mr. Irizarry's only contacts with Ms. Parker 
predated the birth of the children for whom she and the State of 
Utah now seek support. Although Ms. Parker left messages for Mr. 
Irizarry and tried to arrange for him to meet the children, Mr. 
Irizarry made no effort (beyond placing a phone call to Ms. Parker 
when her phone was busy) to contact her, to meet his children, or 
to establish whether the twins were his biological offspring. 
The element of reliance is most difficult for Mr. Irizarry to 
establish in this case and the evidence indicates that his burden 
has not been met. Mr. Irizarry testified that, after his 
conversations with Ms. Parker before the twins were born, he 
incurred further financial obligations by marrying his current wife 
and having additional children. But there is no evidence that his 
decision to enter into a marriage and father other children was 
made in reliance on any statement or inaction of Ms. Parker and, if 
there was any such reliance, it could not have been reasonable. 
Considering that Mr. Irizarry was dating his current wife during 
the pregnancy of Ms. Parker and that his current wife became 
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pregnant before their marriage and less than three months after the 
birth of Brittany and Breanna, Mr. Irizarry's argument concerning 
his reliance is, at best, disingenuous. Additionally, Mr. Irizarry 
continued to incur financial obligations by fathering children 
after the complaint was filed (R.578-579) and a child after an 
order of support for the twins was entered. (R.578-579, R.248-
252). In other words, there is no sufficient showing that Mr. 
Irizarry acted in reliance on any representation concerning his 
lack of financial responsibility for the twins. On the contrary, 
Mr. Irizarry testified that after Ms. Parker informed him of the 
pregnancy with the twins, he decided to just "carry on and marry 
the woman he loved," Patty Irizarry. (R.578). 
The facts of this case demonstrate no representations, either 
explicit or implicit, by Ms. Parker to Mr. Irizarry with respect to 
her claim for child support for her children for the four years 
prior to the filing of this paternity action. The record below 
does not show that Ms. Parker unfairly misled Mr. Irizarry in any 
way, nor that he changed his position to his detriment in reliance 
on any representations, actions, or inactions by Ms. Parker. 
In short, none of the elements of equitable estoppel are 
present in this case. The trial court's ruling to the contrary 
should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to amend 
the judgement against Mr. Irizarry by ordering him to pay child 
support for Breanna and Brittany Parker for the period from May 30, 
1985 to May 30 1989. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower 
court's ruling and judgment to the extent they award no pre-filing 
child support for Mr. Irizarry's twin daughters. In addition, the 
case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of an amended 
judgement against Mr. Irizarry for an appropriate amount of child 
support for the time period from May 30, 1985 through May 30, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted this 6f^rday of January, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
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78-12-22 JUDICIAL CODE 
lapse of time, heirs are also barred, had no ap-
plication where property had been distributed 
in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to 
recover such property distributed to him while 
he was minor within two years after he 
attained majority was not barred from main-
taining action, since limitation did not start to 
run against plaintiff until he had attained ma-
jority under this section Robbms v Duggms, 
61 Utah 542, 216 P. 232 (1923) (decided under 
prior law). 
—Right to title. 
Where defendant purchased tax deed from 
county, and immediately thereafter entered 
into possession of property, paid taxes on prop. 
erty for statutory time, made valuable im. 
provements on property, and held property 
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have 
title to property in controversy against all par-
ties except those under disability. Baker r^. 
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P 117 (1920)." 
Purchaser at tax sale. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur. 2d Limitation Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions 
of Actions § 178 et seq 70 et seq 
C.J.S. — 54 C J S. Limitation of Actions 
§ 105 et seq 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of 
any state or territory within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide 
support or maintenance for dependent children. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Execution to issue 
within eight years, Rule 69(a), U R.C.P 
Judgment a hen for eight years, § 78-22-1 
Uniform Act on Paternity, § 78-45a-l et seq. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§ 78-45-1 et seq 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act $ 77-31-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Judgments or decrees 
Paternity proceedings 
Pleadings. 
Renewal of judgment 
Stipulations 
Support or maintenance. 
Tolling. 
Cited. 
Judgments or decrees. 
Statute of limitations begins to run from 
time of the rendition and entry of judgment or 
decree Sweetser v Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P 
599, 47 L.R.A. (n.s ) 145, 1916C Ann. Cas. 620 
(1913) 
Where judgment payable in installments 
provided that plaintiff could have execution for 
total amount due if default in payments should 
be made, plain intent was that execution 
should issue for only such amounts as were due 
at time of default so that statute did not begin 
to run from date of default Buell v DucheBO* 
Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 (1924)-
In case of a judgment payable in instair 
ments, statute runs from time fixed for p«T 
ment of each installment for the part then p<J| 
able, and not from date of the judgment. Bow 
v Duchesne Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391> f»* 
P 123 (1924) 
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin » 
run until fraud is discovered or could h** 
been reasonably discovered, but even W^J*?! 
tion is not based on fraud, in equity *J** 
cause of action is concealed from one in WW* 
it resides by the one against whom it hes» 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-36 
his residence, and that proceedings under the limitations is not tolled by absence from the 
Nonresident Motorist Act are the only Utah state. Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
proceedings in which the applicable statute of (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937, 945. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 154 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 100. 
A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations 
during absence from state as affected by fact 
that party claiming benefit of limitations re-
mained subject to service during absence or 
nonresidence, 55 A.L.R.3d 1158. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «= 
84, 85. 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of 
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987, 
ch. 19, § 5. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 19, § 6 
provides that the amendment to this section, 
deleting a reference to imprisonment as a dis-
ability, applies only to causes of action that 
arise after April 27, 1987 and has no retroac-
tive application. 
Cross-References. — Actions to recover 
real property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21. 
Age of majority, § 15-2-1. 
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3. 
Guardians of incapacitated persons, 
§ 75-5-301 et seq. 
Medical malpractice actions, limitations pro-
visions applicable regardless of disability, 
§ 78-14-4. 
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions 
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Mental illness. 
Notice of claim requirements. 
—Failure to file. 
Action barred. 
Action not barred. 
Paternity action. 
—Minority. 
Wrongful death. 
—Minonty. 
Cited. 
Mental illness. 
Plaintiffs incest-related psychological prob-
ers
 w e r e n o t a m e n t a i illness that would toll 
«f statute of limitations. Whatcott v. 
whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Notice of claim requirements. 
-Failure to file. 
^lT A c t i o n barred. This section had no application to action 
against town which was barred because of fail-
ure to file claim. Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924). 
This section does not operate to extend statu-
tory time for filing claims against a city until 
after a minor claimant has obtained majority. 
Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 
P.2d 1335 (1972). 
Specific requirement of timely notice to city 
of claim against it takes precedence over provi-
sion tolling statute of limitations during mi-
nority of a child; failure to comply with statu-
tory notice provisions barred action against 
city hospital by parents on behalf of newborn 
infant. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 
799 (Utah 1975). 
Action not barred. 
Notice of claim requirements in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-13, are 
tolled by this section during the period of mi-
nority; therefore, failure to comply with such 
notice requirements by a minor does not bar 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-l 
78-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 14. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Meamng of "this act" — See note under utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68 
same catchline following § 78-45-1 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section 
78-45a-l 
78-45a-2 
78-45a-3 
78-45a-4 
78-45a-5 
78-45a-6 
78-45a-6 5 
78-45a-7 
78-45a-8 
78-45a-l. 
Obligations of the father 
Enforcement 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father 
Limitations on recovery from 
fathers estate 
Remedies 
Time of trial 
Paternity action — Jury trial 
Authority for blood tests 
Selection of experts 
Section 
78-45a-9 
78-45a-10 
78-45a-ll 
78-45a-12 
78-45a-13 
78-45a-14 
78-45a-15 
78-45a-16 
78-45a-17 
Obligations of the father. 
Compensation of expert wi 
nesses 
Effect of test results 
Judgment 
Security 
Settlement agreements 
Venue 
Uniformity of interpretation 
Short title 
Operation of act 
The lather of a child that is or may be born outside of marriage is liable to 
the same extent as the father of a child born withm marriage, whether or not 
the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy 
and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral 
expenses for the child For purposes of child support collection, a child born 
outside of marriage includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband if that paternity has been established 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; 1990, ch. 
245, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23 1990 substituted 
outside of marriage for out of wedlock" in 
both sentences and within marriage for in 
wedlock" in the first sentence added "For pur 
poses of child support collection and the clause 
beginning 'if at the end in the second sen-
tence and made stylistic changes 
Cross-References. — Public support of chil 
dren, §*? 62A-11-301 to 62A-11-332 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§ 78 45 1 et seq 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for reimbursement 
—Collateral estoppel 
—Costs 
Action to establish paternity 
—Attorney fees 
—Statute of limitations 
Tolling 
Cause of action for support 
Custody rights 
—Acknowledgment of paternity 
Right to trial by jury 
Action for reimbursement. 
—Collateral estoppel. 
Where in a paternity action brought for re-
imbursement of money provided for the benefit 
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78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, puta-
tive father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings: 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or 
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, educa-
tion, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. 
245, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "puta-
tive father" in the first sentence and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
sions by Department of Human Services, 
* 62A-M11. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Human Services in collecting 
child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-332 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsej. 
— Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternitv. Borland v 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P 2d 
144 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husband's fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
illegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982) 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Discretion of court. 
Due process of law does not require that all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel, 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
683 
D 
78-45a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Establishing 
Paternity Through HLA Testing: Utah Stan-
dards for Admissibility, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wiese v Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-
parents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by 
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 74 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action for determination of paternity 
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bas-
tardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685. 
Necessity or propriety of appointment of in-
dependent guardian for child who is subject of 
paternity proceedings, 70 A.L.R.4th 1033. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
30 et seq. 
78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. for support or maintenance of dependent chil-
Cross-References. — Limitation of action dren, § 78-12-22. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statute of limitations. 
—Tolling. 
While any statute limiting the time within 
which a paternity action must be commenced 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled 
for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of 
child support is still limited by this section. 
Szarak v Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Clark v. Jeter. Equal Protection Versus Stat-
utes of Limitation in Paternity Actions, 15 J. 
Contemp. L. 119 (1989). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 127. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children *=> 
35. 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are 
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be pay-
able for dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965, 
ch. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 
78-45a-17. 
Cross-References. — Civil liability for sup-
port, Chapter 45 of this title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children 
127 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
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JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Attorney General 
BY: BENJAMIN T. WILSON #5823 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P. O. Box 1980 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980 
Telephone: (801) 538-4660 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, ex rl. 
CATHY A. PARKER, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARRY D. IRIZARRY, 
Defendant. 
| a\S5340 
i ^JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890903363PA 
Judge TYRONE MEDLEY 
This matter came on for trial on February 9, 1993, before 
the Honorable David E. Roth, Senior Judge Pro Tem. Plaintiff, 
State of Utah was represented by Benjami; T. Wilson, Assistant 
Attorney General. Cathy Parker was present. Defendant, Harry D. 
Irizarry, was present and repreF^ttrfi by Elisabeth R. Blattner of 
and for Parsons Behle * Latimer. After hearir*^  the testimony of 
the witnesses, receiving the exhibits and stipulations of the 
parties and the representations and arguments of counsel, the 
Court took the matter ; .ar advisement. n February 11, 1993 at 
9:30 a.m., being fully advised, the Court issued its oral ruling 
Third Judical District 
AUG 1 1 1993 
f,y. 
F 
in this inattar in open court. The Court now has entered its 
written findings c2 fact, and conclusions cf law and 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
i. The judgment of paternity entered in this matter on 
September 1, 1990, is hereby affirmed, and Harry D. Irizarry is 
the father of Breannr* and Brittany Parker born April 18, 1985. 
2. JTJEGJGENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Karry irizarry, in the amount of 
$3,109.00 for back child support for the period from May 31, 1989 
to September 1, 1930. 
3. JUDGMEHT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Iri2arry, in the amount of 
$960*24 for prejudgment interest on the child support owed for 
the period from May 31, 1989 to September I, 1990. 
4. JUDGMEHT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Harry irizarry, in the amount of 
$1,077.71 for child support arrearages under the temporary 
support order in place from Septeniber 1, 1990 through January 31, 
1993. 
5. JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Irizarry, in the amount of 
$300.03 for interest accrued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
10.6(1)(a) on those child support arrearages under the temporary 
2 
support order. 
6. JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Karry Irizarry, in the amount of 
$541.85 for reimbursement of child care expenses paid by 
plaintiff from May 31, 1989 through the time of trial. 
7. JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cathy 
Parker, and against Defendant, Harry Irizarry, in the amount of 
$187.35 for prejudgment interest on that child care. 
8. Commencing March 1, 1993, defendant is ordered to 
pay to the plaintiff State of Utah, office of Recovery Services, 
as ongoing child support, the sum of $289.15 per month consistent 
with the attached Child Support Obligation Worksheet and 
Worksheet to Determine Father's Obligations to Children in His 
Present Home which are incorporated herein for reference. 
9. The mother is responsible for uninsured routine 
medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits, 
physical examinations, and immunizations. 
10. If medical, hospital and dental insurance are 
available or become available through an employer or union at 
group rates, or are otherwise available at reasonable cost, vo 
either the mother or the father, or both of them, then the mother 
or the father, or both of them, as the case may be, shall 
maintain such insurance coverage. 
3 
11. The mother and the father shall share equally all 
other reasonable and necessary uninsured medical and dental 
expenses. Tne custodial parent shall notify the non-custodici 
parent TTithin a reasonable time of any such incurred expenses for 
which she desires reimbursement. 
12. The father's total child support obligation 
includes the base child support plus his share of any non-
routine, uninsured medical and dent*;_ expenses. 
13. The father may xec?\ ^ as a credit against his 
base child support obligation, the child'•$ pore ion of any monthly 
payments made directly by him for re^onabl^ medical and dental 
insurance premiums> 
14. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 62A-11-404.5, the 
father's income is subject to iremediate and automatic withholding 
for the payment of child support. 
15. All written verification of payment of insurance 
premiums and all payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery 
Services, P. 0. Box 45011, Salt LaJce City, UT 84145, unless ths 
Office gives written notice that such should be sent elsewhere. 
16. Both parties are ordered to provide each other and 
tiie State of Utah with notice of any 10% change in gross monthly 
income, or any change in their residence, employment, medical, 
hospital and dental insurance premiums or coverage, 
4 
17. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-320.5, 
either the father or the mother may periodically request of the 
Utah Department of Human Services c, review of the child support 
order entered by the court in this case. 
DAY OF LAA^i^ 1993. DATED THIS Ji 
TYRi 
Dt$TRICT COURT 
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